The problem with this template is that our definitions of terms such as "conventional" or "combined arms" are essentially static. Combined arms warfare has been around in various forms since Roman times, but to many combined arms will always equal infantry, artillery, armor, and airpower working together. It makes more sense, as Archer Jones does, to think of a series of basic weapon systems that repeat themselves in various forms throughout history. Furthermore, we should not confuse conventional warfare with a modern conventional Eurasian force -- many conflicts since 1945 have been fought with grossly underpowered Third World conventional forces armed with superpower leftovers. [...]
Owen makes a persuasive point that history shows -- from the Boer War to the first Russian incursion into Chechnya -- that underpowered forces can defeat numerically and technologically superior conventional armies on the tactical level. Given the right terrain, discipline and usage of weapons these forces can punch well above their weight. However, there are limits to what a ragtag "Toyota Horde" can accomplish. The largely conventional Tamil Tigers, for example, were isolated from their sources of foreign support and wiped out by aggressive Sri Lankan forces. Saddam Hussein's attempts to use the Fedayeen as a paramilitary fighting force in 2003 had no real strategic effect on the Coalition forces crushing Iraq's military.
Au-delà de l'incapacité de l'OTAN à définir un but de guerre et une stratégie pour son intervention en Libye, n'y aurait-il pas aussi une énorme difficulté à conduire une guerre hybride combinant force aérienne et troupes irrégulières (et inexpérimentées) ? N'est-ce pas trop tôt pour en juger ?
The Huffington Post : The Flexibility of Conventional Warfare, par Adam Elkus
En complément :
1. The New York Times : Libyan Rebels Don’t Really Add Up to an Army
2. EGEA : 4 questions à Michel Goya